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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-000O000-
WILLIAM RAY GAGON, 
Plaintiff, 
STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
APPELLANTS BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Case No. 20777 
Priority 13 
-000O000— 
IDENTITY OF PARTIES 
The only interested parties are named in the caption. 
PUBLISHED OPINION 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals of which Respondent seeks 
review is Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
73 Utah Adv. Rep. 83,476 P.2d 1194 (1987), reproduced infra at A-2. 
PRIOR HISTORY 
This civil action was filed on December \21, 1983, in the District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County. A jury trial wasl held on May 16 and 17, 
1985, during which the Honorable John A Rokicn granted the motion of 
Defendant/Respondent for a directed verdict on the "bad faith" issues, thus 
limiting any recovery by Plaintiff to the amounts ovjed by the insurer under 
the terms of its policy. A copy of the Judgment entered on June 3, 1985, is 
reproduced infra at A-9. 
Plaintiff/Appellant appealed to this Court and this Court deferred 
the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to its "pour-over" 
jurisdiction. Oral argument was held on the 29th day of October, 1987, and 
the Court of Appeals entered its decision on December 18,1987. 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge had erred in 
directing a verdict against Plaintiff/Appellant on the "bad faith" issues, 
reversed, and remanded the case to the District Court for trial on those 
issues. Defendant/Respondent/Petitioner now seeks further review of the 
matter by this Court pursuant to a Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At all relevant times, Appellant William Ray Gagon (hereinafter 
"Mr. Gagon") was protected under a policy of automobile insurance that 
specifically included so-called "collision" coverage. (Answer, paragraph 1, 
R. at 14.) That automobile insurance policy was issued by Respondent/ 
Petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter 
"State Farm"). (Id.) 
On September 17, 1983, Mr. Gagon was driving his insured vehicle 
along a frontage road adjacent to Interstate 15 by the Great Salt Lake west 
of Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. at 281, 282, and 290.) Mr. Gagon was following 
behind a pickup truck loaded with assorted junk and scrap. (R. at 283.) A 
metal object fell from the pickup (R. at 283) and, although he attempted to 
avoid it by swerving, Mr. Gagon's vehicle "straddled" the object, which struck 
the underside of the vehicle. (R. at 284). Mr. Gagon immediately pulled to 
the right side of the road, stopped his car, and got out to inspect for 
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damage. (R. at 285-286.) He looked under the froht of the vehicle and noted 
that the spoiler under the front grill had been broken but could see no oil or 
other evidence of damage to the engine. (R. at 283-286.) Mr. Gagon loaded 
the broken spoiler into his car, got back in the car, and proceeded on. 
(R. at 285-286.) 
As he gained speed, Mr. Gagon noted that the engine somewhat 
seemed to lack power, as if it had "bad gas." (R. at 287-88.) After he had 
proceeded only a short distance, he noted that thel engine was losing power 
and making a little unusual noise. (R. at 288 .) At this same time he 
observed that the oil light was on. (R. at 289.) H^ immediately shut off the 
engine and coasted. (Id.) He then attempted to j^ush the car (Id.) until he 
realized that this was not possible (R. at 290). Concerned about being 
stranded in what he considered a remote area (R. at 289-90), Mr. Gagon 
briefly attempted to restart the engine, but abandoned this effort before the 
engine actually started because he heard the motoil make an unusual noise. 
(R. at 290.) He secured the vehicle by replacing! the convertible top and 
locking the doors. (R. at 291.) Mr. Gagon then sought assistance and had 
the vehicle towed to Steve Harris Imports, wherfe repairs were effected. 
(R. at 291,293, and 315.) 
Upon inspection, it was discovered that th^ impact had disabled the 
oil pump (which is located inside the oil pan) (R. ai 296), thus depriving the 
engine of lubrication. As a result of this loss of lubrication, the engine was 
severely damaged, necessitating repairs costing $1,517.99. (See, Exhibit 4.) 
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Mr. Gagon reported the incident to State Farm (R. at 295 and 434) 
and, on September 23, 1983, State Farm sent a damage appraiser to look at 
the vehicle (R. at 439). But on September 26, 1983 (R. at 39), the appraiser 
prepared a damage estimate only with respect to those parts of the vehicle 
that had made direct contact with the object in the road (Le., the spoiler, oil 
pan, etc.) (R. at 436), stated in his written notes that coverage would not 
exist for the mechanical damage, and so informed the service manager at 
Steve Harris Imports (Id.). Thereafter, on October 5, 1983, Mr. Gagon was 
interviewed by State Farm's claims department and signed a written statement 
prepared by State Farm detailing the circumstances under which the damage 
had occurred. State Farm has acknowledged that, at the time the statement 
was signed and at the time of the trial, the statement accurately reflected 
the events that had transpired. (R. at 448 and 464.) 
The claims representative handling the file, Doug Nelson, apparently 
felt that coverage could be denied for the mechanical damage to the engine. 
(R. at 444.) Accordingly, he went to claims supervisor Leon Maxwell and 
recommended that State Farm not pay for any of the mechanical damage. 
(Id.) Mr. Maxwell prepared a "Claims Committee Report" in which he 
recommended that State Farm "deny engine damage sustained after initial 
collision as mechanical failure-wear & tear." (R. at 472). A "claims 
committee," composed of various State Farm claims personnel, met on October 
12, 1983, and denied the claim based upon the policy's "wear and tear" 
exclusion (R. at 473 and 476), instructing Mr. Maxwell to hold the decision 
for a week and then notify Mr. Gagon of the denial of his claim (R. at 447). 
Prior to this decision, State Farm made no investigation of the incident other 
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than to accept and rely upon the written statement signed by Mr. Gagon. 
(R. at 444-45.) On October 18, 1983, Mr. Maxwell wrote to Mr. Gagon, 
informing him that, based upon the "wear and teftr" exclusion, State Farm 
would not pay for any of the engine damage and ^hat it would pay only for 
the damage to the spoiler and the dented oil pan. 
At trial, Mr. Nelson acknowledged th^t State Farm's internal 
procedures allowed for Mr. Gagon to submit information or argument in 
support of his claim to the claims committee (R. at 475) and claimed that his 
letter of October 18, 1983, served to notify Mr. Gagon of this right (Id.). Of 
course, at the direction of the claims committee, the letter was, in actuality, 
mailed six days after the claims committee's "final decision." (R. at 476.) 
At trial, Mr. Nelson testified that there were no set criteria to 
determine whether or not State Farm would pay for loss of lubrication 
damages under its policy. (R. at 441.) In fact, however, State Farm provides 
to its claims personnel, in an effort to help them understand the terms and 
provisions of State Farm's automobile policy, a Claims handling manual." 
(R. at 446.) Both of the State Farm employees handling Mr. Gagon's claim 
admitted, however, that they had not consulted the "claims handling manual" 
in connection with this claim. (Id. and R. at 482-^3.) In its discussion of 
losses such as Mr. Gagon's, State Farm's own Claims handling manual 
specifically states: 
Claims for damage to the motor caused by the loss 
of oil following a roadbed collision will qualify for 
payment under any form of Collision C o v e r a g e . . . . 
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This has the effect of treating motor damage 
following a roadbed collision as a part of the direct 
damage, instead of indirect damage. . . . 
Exhibit 9-P. 
The only ground ever given by State Farm (before this litigation 
was commenced) for its denial of Mr. Gagon's claim for the mechanical 
damage to his engine was the policy exclusion of coverage for damage "due to 
and limited to wear and tear ." (See, e.g., denial letter of 
18 October 83.) At trial (R. at 474), however, as well as in an earlier 
deposition (Maxwell Depo. at 89), State Farm's claims supervisor, Leon 
Maxwell, admitted that he knew Mr. Gagon's engine was damaged because it 
was not getting oil and that the lack of oil was caused by the inoperable 
condition of the oil pump. He also acknowledged that he knew that the oil 
pump had become inoperable because of the impact with the object in the 
road and that he knew that the oil pump had not worn out. (R. at 474 and 
Maxwell Depo. at 89.) Thus, Mr. Maxwell acknowledged both at trial and in 
an earlier deposition that he knew that the damage to Mr. Gagon's engine 
was the result of the impact with the object in the road and that the damage 
was not the result of an engine component wearing out. 
When Mr. Gagon's car had been repaired, he was unable to pay for 
the repairs and the dealer refused to release the car until the charges were 
paid for in full. (R. at 315-19.) In the course of conversations with the 
dealer, it was suggested to Mr. Gagon that he should consult with an attorney 
since State Farm was refusing to pay his claim. (R. at 321-24.) Acting on 
this advice, Mr. Gagon consulted with Val Antczak, an attorney with the law 
firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer, who wrote a demand letter to State Farm 
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pointing out that denial based upon the "wear afrd tear" exclusion of the 
policy was entirely without merit. (R. at 323-24.) Nevertheless, State Farm 
persisted in its denial of the claim. Mr. Antcza^ c referred Mr. Gagon to 
Appellant's present counsel and this suit ensued. (R. i^t 324.) 
It was only after suit was filed that St^te Farm first raised the 
question of the reasonableness of Mr. Gagon's conduct In its Answer, it 
alleged that Mr. Gagon had been contributorily negligent. (R. at 16.) In 
response to Mr. Gagon's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, State Farm 
contended that Mr. Gagon had been negligent and had unreasonably continued 
to operate his vehicle once he knew that the lubrication system had been 
damaged. However, State Farm still made no investigation of this contention 
and admittedly continued to accept Mr. Gagon's statement as being correct. 
It was acknowledged at trial (R. at 450) las it had earlier been by 
Mr. Maxwell in his deposition (Maxwell Depo. at 69), that it was State Farm's 
practice to "compromise" rather than pay in full Claims of its insureds for 
engine damage resulting from loss of lubrication. Mr. Maxwell testified at 
trial that he knew of no such claim that had beeni paid in full (R. at 458), 
although he admitted that the local State Farm office handles one or two 
such claims per month (R. at 456). Similarly, Mr. Nelson, who has been with 
State Farm for 23 years (R. at 441), testified that tie, personally, had never 
paid a loss of lubrication claim (R. at 442). Thtis, despite the fact that 
during discovery State Farm had refused to provide information with respect 
to its denial of other similar claims, and the trial c^ nirt denied Mr. Gagon's 
motion to compel State Farm to provide that information (R. at 232-33), there 
is substantial and unrefuted evidence of a continuing practice by State Farm 
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to deny the claims of its insureds for engine damage as a result of loss of 
lubrication following an impact with an object in the road. 
At trial, the court refused to allow any testimony and refused to 
admit any evidence relating either to counsel fees as consequential damages 
or to the measure of punitive damages. (R. at 409-11.) At the conclusion of 
Plaintiffs case, State Farm moved for a directed verdict on the ,fbad faith" 
issue. This motion, argued after Defendant had rested, was then granted. 
(R. at 539.) While the jury found, of course, that coverage existed for the 
internal damage to Mr. Gagon's engine and that Mr. Gagon's conduct had not 
contributed to that damage (R. at 234), the jury was, nevertheless, unable to 
award any damages beyond the cost of repairing the vehicle. Mr. Gagon was, 
therefore, left without any meaningful redress since his costs and counsel 
fees far exceeded his recovery. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, authored by Judge Greenwood 
with which Judges Billings and Bench both concurred, while abbreviated, is 
entirely consistent with these facts. 746 P.2d at 1194. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: REVIEW BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS NOT APPROPRIATE 
IN THIS CASE. 
The considerations governing the granting of a Writ of Certiorari 
by this Court to review a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals are set forth 
in Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. That rule makes clear 
8 
that a Writ of Certiorari will be granted only Infrequently and in truly 
extraordinary cases: 
Review by a Writ of Certiorari is hot a matter of 
right, but judicial discretion, and will be granted only 
when there are special and important reasons therefor. 
Rule 43, R.U.S.C. (emphasis added). 
This case meets none of the four criteria set forth in the rule 
because there is no conflict between panels of thei Court of Appeals; there 
can be no contention that the Court of Appeals has "so far departed from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings . . ." as to require review 
of its decision; the legal questions decided by tl^ e Court of Appeals fall 
squarely within the holding of this Court in Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); and, for the $ame reason, there is no 
conflict between the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case and 
any prior decision of this Court. 
There is nothing unusual or extraordinary about this case; it is 
simply a case in which a simple insurance claim ^as made and improperly 
denied by the carrier. Legally and philosophically, the facts of the case fall 
squarely within the principles articulated by this C0urt in Beck. The Court 
of Appeals simply applied those principles in determining that the trial judge 
in this case had erred when he ruled as a matter of law that no reasonable 
mind could have believed the insurance carrier's conduct to have been in 
breach of the three-pronged duty set forth in Beck for the carrier to 
diligently investigate, fairly evaluate, and promptly handle claims. In this 
case, the facts demonstrate that the carrier failed to fairly evaluate and made 
little, if any, investigation of the claim. Accordingly, the fact that the 
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carrier acted promptly and courteously in denying the claim constituted no 
defense to Plaintiffs claims and the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the 
trial judge who had ruled to the contrary. 
In an effort to bring this case within the extremely narrow 
parameters of Rule 43, Defendant/Respondent/Petitioner State Farm attempts 
to create artificially a tension or inconsistentcy between the Court of 
Appeals' decision in this case as compared with this Court's decision in 
Western Casualty and Surety Company v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980), 
and the Court of Appeals' decision in Callioux v. Progressive Insurance 
Company, 745 P.2d 838 (Utah CtApp. 1987). Both of those cases, however, 
stand merely for the proposition that an insurance carrier has a right to 
dispute or deny coverage in those cases in which a legitimate, real, and good 
faith question exists as to the insured's entitlement to coverage. Mr. Gagon 
recognizes and does not dispute this obviously true proposition. In the 
present case, however, Mr. Gagon presented to the trial court a strong 
showing that there existed no real question as to his entitlement to coverage. 
For example, State Farm's own claims manual said that there was coverage 
under these circumstances; State Farm's claims manager testified that he knew 
that the engine damage had resulted from loss of lubrication as a result of 
the impact and that he knew that the oil pump had not simply worn out; and 
State Farm's employees admitted at trial that they never paid claims similar 
to Mr. Gagon's. Accordingly, in this case, State Farm denied a claim that it 
knew it should have paid and that its own claims handling manual mandated 
should be paid. Factually, then, this case is entirely distinguishable from the 
Marchant and Callioux cases in which the carrier successfully demonstrated 
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reasonable, legitimate, good faith reasons to doubt coverage.1 Under these 
circumstances, this case does not fall within the narrowly defined parameters 
under which review by Writ of Certiorari should be granted. 
To allow further review in this case ip merely to protract the 
litigation process. The Utah Court of Appeals was not intended to create yet 
a third step in the litigation process, it was intended to reduce the 
insurmountable workload of this Court. To allow rekriew by Writ of Certiorari 
in this case would be to wholly defeat that beneficial purpose. 
*For example, in Callioux, the insured was changed with arson although 
found not guilty at the criminal trial. Similarly, iiji Marchant, there was a 
real question as to the identity of the actual employer of the injured 
claimant. No such legitimate questions existed in this cfase. 
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POINT II: THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS 
CORRECT AND FURTHER REVIEW IS UNNECESSARY. 
A review of the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals indicates the 
thoroughness with which the Court reviewed and the care with which the 
Court considered this matter. After surveying the applicable facts, the Court 
of Appeals noted: 
It was undisputed that State Farm denied coverage for 
plaintiffs claim because "the damages sustained to the 
internal parts of the engine were not a result of a 
collision loss but rather a result of a mechanical failure, 
wear and tear." However, State Farm's claims manual 
states: 
MOTOR DAMAGE FROM LOSS 
OF OIL: 
Claims for damage to the motor 
caused by the loss of oil following a 
roadbed collision will qualify for 
payment under any form of Collision 
Coverage. 
At trial[,] plaintiff testified that he was in the 
wholesale jewelry business and had never worked on cars 
other than adding windshield washer fluid, radiator fluid 
and oil. He testified that he had stopped his car after 
hitting the metal object, looked under the car and did 
not see any oil. After inspecting the car, he drove for 
another three miles before he noticed a loss of power, 
observed that the oil light was on and stopped the car. 
In addition, there was conflicting testimony as to 
whether the loss of lubrication occurred within seconds 
of impact with the metal object or whether plaintiff 
caused the damage by continuing to operate the vehicle. 
Based on these facts, . . . we conclude that 
reasonable persons could reach different conclusions as 
to whether State Farm fairly evaluated the claim and 
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acted reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. 
Therefore, we hold that, in light of Bec;k, the directed 
verdict on the bad faith issue was improperly granted, 
and the issue should have been decided by the jury. 
746 P.2d at 1196-97. Given the fact that State Farm's own claims handling 
manual mandated that it pay in full the claim that it denied, how could the 
Court of Appeals have ruled otherwise? 
Not only did State Farm fail to "fairly evaluate" this claim (which 
it denied when its own claims manual said it should have been paid), but its 
investigation failed to reveal a single fact that coul^ i have supported a denial 
based upon the wear and tear exclusion. At the 
State Farm had only Mr. Gagon's statement and it 
time it denied the claim, 
acknowledged at trial that 
it had no reason to doubt that statement. That statement contains no fact or 
implication that would support a denial of the | claim. If the duty to 
"diligently investigate" is to have any meaning, it mkist mean that the carrier 
at least has the duty to investigate to determine Whether there are facts to 
support its denial. In this case, State Farm's investigation wholly failed to 
offer any support for a denial under the wear and tear exclusion. As its 
claims personnel admitted at trial, State Farm knew J 
damaged because the oil pump was not working and 
working because of the impact with the object in the road. State Farm knew 
that the oil pump had not simply worn out. Under pese circumstances, State 
Farm has acknowledged that it knew that there wasl no factual support for a 
denial under the wear and tear exclusion. 
Not only is the Court of Appeals' decision correct with respect to 
the question of "bad faith," it is a correct application of this Court's decision 
that the engine had been 
that the oil pump was not 
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in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), with 
respect to the types of damages recoverable by the insured victim of an 
insurer's ffbad faith" conduct. On this issue in Beck, this Court noted: 
In adopting the contract approach, we are not 
ignoring the principal reason for the adoption of the tort 
approach — to provide damage exposure in excess of the 
policy limits and thus remove any incentive for breaching 
the duty of good faith . . . . 
701 P.2d at 801 (emphasis added). This Court, perhaps in order to remove 
even the possibility of any lingering doubt as to whether damages in excess 
of the coverage defined by the policy contract might be recovered by the 
insured in a "bad faith" action in Utah, again reiterated: 
In an action for breach of a duty to bargain in good 
faith, a broad range of recoverable damages is 
conceivable, particularly given the unique nature and 
purpose of an insurance contract. An insured frequently 
faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not available 
within a reasonable period of time to cover an insured 
loss; damages for losses well in excess of the policy 
limits, such as for a home or a business, may therefore 
be foreseeable and provable. . . . 
Id. at 802 (emphasis added, citation omitted). 
In this case, there was evidence before the trial court that State 
Farm had refused to pay Mr. Gagon's claim even though its claims manual 
mandated such payment; that State Farm knew that there was no factual basis 
for application of the "wear and tear" exclusion; and that State Farm had a 
long-established pattern of denying such claims. As recognized by this 
Court's decision in Beck, the most important social policy furthered by the 
"bad faith" concept (whether based in tort or based in contract) is the 
discouragement of the repetition of reprehensible and irresponsible conduct by 
insurers. When the amount of the claim the carrier refuses to pay is 
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relatively large, the insured has reasonable recourse to the courts and to 
justice because the size of the claim not only justifies, but actually makes 
possible, the retention of legal counsel and the litigation, through trial if 
necessary, of the insured's claim. However, where the amount of the claim 
that the carrier has refused to pay is relatively small - such as the claim in 
this case, which was less than $1,500.00 -- the insured is left, as a practical 
matter, with no effective redress or recourse whatsoever. He can complain to 
the insurer, who will disregard his protestations; he can complain to the 
Insurance Commissioner, who will listen to his complaints and sadly inform 
him that, although justified, payment cannot be Compelled; he can seek 
attorneys, who will listen to him and tell him that he has a valid claim, but 
that he cannot afford their time. It is only through punitive damages that 
two important purposes can be furthered. First, t)ie insured can be made 
whole and compensated for his loss and for his courage in pursuing a small 
claim that others would have been forced to decide Was "too small" to pursue. 
Second, the insurer can be discouraged from attempting to perpetrate against 
others such pernicious conduct. The Court of Appe4ls was, therefore, correct 
in directing that the question of punitive damages be reached if, on retrial, 
State Farm is found to have acted in "bad faith." 
Punitive damages are also appropriate in this case because State 
Farm's conduct meets the standard articulated by ttiis Court in Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 198^). Before this Court in 
that case was a widow's action for the wrongful de^th of her husband, who 
had died when the defendant, an alcoholism treatment center, had given him a 
safety razor with which to shave but with which he instead committed 
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suicide. This Court held that punitive damages might be awarded without a 
showing of actual malice: 
Such damages may . . . be appropriate to take the 
profit out of wrongdoing where compensatory damages 
are small in relation to the resources of a defendant and 
can be subsumed as a cost of doing business . . . 
675 P.2d at 1187. Since the compensatory damages to which Mr. Gagon is 
entitled are small (even when his counsel fees are included as an element of 
damages), State Farm can easily treat those compensatory and consequential 
damages as merely a "cost of doing business." Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals was correct in its determination that the question of punitive 
damages should be reached in the event that the jury, on remand, should find 
that State Farm acted in "bad faith." 
CONCLUSION 
This case falls far short of meeting the very narrowly defined 
parameters under which this Court should grant a petition for review of a 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals by Writ of Certiorari. The Court of 
Appeals was intended to reduce this Court's insurmountable workload, not to 
add a third step to the litigation process. Accordingly, only in infrequent 
and truly extraordinary cases should certiorari be granted. The decision of 
the Court of Appeals in this case is entirely consistent with the law 
announced by this Court in a recent decision squarely on point. Further 
review is not appropriate. 
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Moreover, the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, in this case, 
is correct and appropriate under the facts of the ca^e. Further review is not 
appropriate and the petition for Writ of Certiorari mujst be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of March, 1988. 
PARKEN & llfecK 
)rney for Plaintiff/ 
jllabt 
ORIGINAL SIGNATURE 
John D. Parken 
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Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company 
Case No. 860137-CA 
Judgment A-9 
A-l 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
William Ray Gagon, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, 
a/k/a State Farm 
Insurance Companies, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Timothy r j. Sh^f; 
Before Judges Greenwood, B i l l i n g s and Bench. utsh court of Apv^s 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff, William Ray Gagon, brought this action against 
defendant/ State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
(State Farm), for payment of his insurance claim and for 
alleged bad faith refusal to pay his claim. Plaintiff appeals 
from the trial court's directed verdict against him on the bad 
faith issue. We reverse and remand. 
On September 17, 1983, plaintiff was driving his 1979 
Fiat Spider when a metal object fell out of the back of a 
pickup truck he was following and struck the underside of his 
car. Plaintiff stopped his car and noted that the plastic 
spoiler under the front grill had been broken, but he could see 
no oil or other evidence of damage to the car. Plaintiff then 
restarted the car and drove about three miles. While driving, 
he noticed that the car lacked power and that he was unable to 
drive faster than forty-five or fifty miles per hour. Towards 
the end of the three miles, he observed that the oil light was 
on. He stopped the car, tried to push it and briefly attempted 
to restart it. When the car would not start, plaintiff had it 
towed to Steve Harris Imports where inspection revealed that 
the oil pump was broken. Because the oil pump stopped 
functioning, the engine was damaged due to loss of lubrication, 
costing $1,517.99 to repair. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860137-CA 
F I L E D 
DEC 181987 
a_o 
Plaintiff reported the incident to State Farm on September 
19, 1983. On September 23, State Farm's appraiser examined the 
vehicle and prepared a damage estimate indicating that State Farm 
would only cover the external damage to the car and not the 
internal damage due to loss of lubrication. On October 5, 1983, 
plaintiff went to State Farm's office and signed a statement 
explaining the circumstances of the incident. On October 12, 
1983, State Farm's claims committee determined that plaintiff's 
claim would be denied "for internal repairs to the engine because 
of mechanical failure - wear and tear." On October 18, 1983, 
State Farm informed plaintiff of its decision to deny coverage for 
internal repairs and allow coverage for only the external damage. 
In December 1983, plaintiff initiated this action alleging that 
State Farm's refusal to pay his claim wa£ in bad faith. 
On the first day of trial, the parties stipulated that the 
case would be tried on the bad faith isstie, and if the jury found 
bad faith, plaintiff could then submit evidence of punitive 
damages. On the second day of trial, the court disallowed 
plaintiff's evidence of attorney fees with the proviso that he 
would reconsider the admissibility of attorney fees if the jury 
found bad faith. After the parties had presented their evidence, 
both parties moved for a directed verdict. The trial judge 
granted State Farm's motion on the issue of whether State Farm 
acted in bad faith in refusing to pay plaintiff's insurance claim 
and denied plaintiff's motion regarding coverage under the policy 
for engine damage. The judge then allowed the jury to determine 
whether plaintiff was entitled to all the damages resulting from 
the accident. The jury awarded plaintiff $1,517.99, less 
plaintiff's insurance deductible of $200
 4 plus ten percent 
interest from September 17, 1983. Plaintiff appeals claiming that 
the trial court erred in granting State Farm's motion for a 
directed verdict on the bad faith claim since reasonable minds 
could have found that State Farm acted in bad faith. Plaintiff 
also contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of 
punitive damages and consequential damages including attorney 
fees. 
I. 
In reviewing a directed verdict, the court must examine all 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party. 
Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson. 692 P.2d 728, 732 (Utah 1984). If the 
evidence permits reasonable persons to r$ach different conclusions 
on the issues, the directed verdict should not be granted. Little 
Am. Ref. Co. v. Levba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982); Cerritos 
Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 l(.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982). 
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After the trial court granted State Farm's motion for a 
directed verdict on the bad faith issue, the Utah Supreme Court 
rendered Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P. 2d 795 (Utah 
1985).* In Beck, the Court held that "as parties to a 
contract, the insured and the insurer have parallel obligations 
to perform the contract in good faith.- Id. at 801. The Court 
then defined the obligation of good faith as contemplating that 
Hthe insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it 
to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the 
claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in 
rejecting or settling the claim." l£l. In addition, the Court 
stated that the duty of good faith -requires the insurer to 'deal 
with laymen as laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of law 
and underwriting* and to refrain from actions that will injure 
the insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the contract." 
Id. 
With these principles in mind and viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to plaintiff, we examine whether 
reasonable minds could differ as to whether State Farm breached 
its obligation of good faith. It was undisputed that State Farm 
denied coverage for plaintiff's claim because "the damages 
sustained to the internal parts of the engine were not a result 
of a collision loss but rather a result of a mechanical failure, 
wear and tear." However, State Farm's claims manual states: 
MOTOR DAMAGE FROM LOSS OF OIL: 
Claims for damage to the motor caused 
by the loss of oil following a roadbed 
collision will qualify for payment under 
any form of Collision Coverage. 
1. Beck overruled Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 
25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971) to the extent that Lvon was 
philisophically inconsistent with the Beck Court's recognition of 
a cause of action in contract for the insurer's failure to 
perform the contract in good faith and noted that Lyon considered 
only the question of whether a claim of bad faith gave rise to a 
tort cause of action. Beck, 701 P.2d at 798 n.l. The Court 
characterized the ruling in Lvon as leaving "an insured without 
any effective remedy against an insurer that refuses to bargain 
or settle in good faith with the insured." Id. at 798. 
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A roadbed collision shall be deemed 
to be any contact between the insured 
vehicle and the roadbed, or ai^ y object 
fixed, frozen or imbedded in the road such 
as a rock, stump, or any other| stationary 
object. 
There should be a reasonable 
compliance with that conditio^ of the 
policy which provides, 'When loss occurs 
the named insured shall use every 
reasonable means to protect the damaged 
property covered by this policy* from any 
further damage.• 
This has the effect of treating motor 
damage following a roadbed collision as a 
part of the direct damage, instead of 
indirect damage. Reference to the 
Conditions Section is made because the 
payment should not include any amount for 
damage resulting from the further 
operation of the vehicle after damage to 
the oil pan or to the motor has become 
known to the operator, or after the 
existence of damage should have become 
known by the operator exercising 
reasonable care. 
At trial plaintiff testified that he Was in the wholesale 
jewelry business and had never worked on cars other than adding 
windshield washer fluid, radiator fluid and oil. He also 
testified that he had stopped his car aftbr hitting the metal 
object, looked under the car and did not see any oil. After 
inspecting the car, he drove for another three miles before he 
noticed a loss of power, observed that the oil light was on and 
stopped the car. In addition, there was conflicting testimony 
as to whether the loss of lubrication occurred within seconds 
of impact with the metal object or whether plaintiff caused the 
damage by continuing to operate the vehicle. Plaintiffs 
witness, Gary Majnik, who repaired his car, testified that an 
engine in a Fiat Spider could be damaged jby loss of lubrication 
within seconds of hitting an object. Plaintiff also called 
another mechanic, Steve Crane, who testified that a person 
without general knowledge of mechanics, wpo hit something on 
the underside of a 1979 Fiat and dented the oil pan, would not 
know whether to continue driving the car other than as 
indicated by the warning systems in the car. He also stated 
that the warnings systems can malfunction!. 
860137-CA 4 
Based on these facts, we find that reasonable minds could 
differ as to whether plaintiff, exercising reasonable care, 
knew or should have known that the oil pump was damaged and 
that he should not continue to drive the car. Further, we 
conclude that reasonable persons could reach different 
conclusions as to whether State Farm fairly evaluated the claim 
and acted reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. 
Therefore, we hold that, in light of Beck, the directed verdict 
on the bad faith issue was improperly granted, and the issue 
should have been decided by the jury. 
II. 
The second issue is whether the court improperly excluded 
evidence of punitive damages and consequential damages 
including attorney fees. Immediately prior to the trial in 
this case, the judge stated on the record that the parties and 
the court agreed to exclude evidence of punitivss damages unless 
and until the jury found that State Farm had acted in bad 
faith. No objection was voiced by plaintiff. Therefore, we 
find no merit in plaintiff's claim that evidence of punitive 
damages was improperly excluded. On the second day of trial, 
the court stated that it would exclude evidence of attorney 
fees but would reserve the right to later admit evidence of 
attorney fees if the jury found bad faith. Generally, attorney 
fees are not chargeable to an opposing party unless there is 
contractual or statutory liability for them. Espinoza v. 
Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1979). However, 
according to Beck, consequential damages such as attorney fees 
may be recoverable in an insurance carrier lack of good faith 
case. Beck, 701 P.2d at 801-02. Therefore, we find no error 
in the exclusion of attorney fees until after plaintiff 
established that State Farm breached its implied obligation of 
good faith. If lack of good faith is found on remand, 
consideration of punitive damages and consequential damages 
will be appropriate. 
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Reversed and remanded. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
WILLIAM RAY GAGON, 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a/k/a 
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. C83-8753 
Judge John A. Rokich 
oooOooo 
This action came on for trial before the Court and a 
Jury, the Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge, presiding, 
commencing on May 16, 1985, and concluding May 20, 1985. After 
the evidence was presented, the Court granted Defendant's motion 
for a Directed Verdict on Plaintiff's cause of action for bad 
faith including Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages and 
1 
attorney fees. The remaining matter was submitted to the Jury on 
special Interrogatories. The Jury answered both of the following 
questions in the negative: 
1. Under the policy of insurance, coverage is excluded 
for damages due to and limited to mechancial failure - wear and 
tear. With the exception of the parts broken when the car 
impacted the object in the roadway, was the Plaintiff's damage to 
the internal components of his engine due to and limited to 
mechanical failure - wear and tear, within the meaning of the 
insurance policy exclusion? 
2. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, and 
as defined in these instructions, did the Plaintiff fail to 
protect his vehicle and thereby fail to mitigate his damage? 
This issue having been duly tried and the Jury having 
duly rendered its special verdict and the parties having 
stipulated that the sum of $1,517.99 is a reasonable sum for the 
repairs to Plaintiff's automobile, which repairs where at issue 
in this action/ less plaintiff's insurance deduction of $200.00. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff William Ray Gagon recover from the Defendant State Farm 
2 
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Company the sum of $1,317.99 in 
special damages together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% 
per annum from September 17, 1983, (the date of the occurrence of 
the act giving rise to the cause of action) to the date of this 
judgment and Plaintiff's costs of action. The total amount of 
this judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum 
from and after the date hereof* * 
DATED this *D day of TRTy, l£85. 
BY THE COU^T: 
Attorney for Defendant 
>j/n A . Jojfn Ro^ich 
D i s t r i c t J^idge 
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